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Imag(in)ing September 11
Ward Churchill, Frame Contestation,
and Media Hegemony
Erika G. King
Mary deYoung
Grand Valley State University
This study analyzes the Denver Post’s reportage on the frame contest between the dom-
inant narrative of the September 11 terrorist attacks set out by President Bush and a
challenge to that narrative in an Internet essay by Professor Ward Churchill. The
authors find that by refusing to interrogate Churchill’s sociopolitical argument, reduc-
ing it to the offensive rhetorical trope “little Eichmanns” he used to describe the victims
of the attacks, and pillorying Churchill as a person and scholar, the Post assured his
counterframe would not achieve parity with the dominant frame. The authors interpret
this as an example of media hegemony and situate the Post’s coverage within a crisis
of hegemony that left the “sacred core” of the Bush frame—American innocence and
moral exceptionalism—vulnerable to contestation. Because the Churchill counterframe
flagrantly transgressed that “sacred core,” it became the irresistible target of media
hegemony strategies by the Denver Post.
Keywords: counterframe; frame contestation; media hegemony; September 11 ter-
rorist attacks; Ward Churchill
On September 11, 2001, three hijacked commercial airliners slammed into theU.S. Pentagon and the twin towers of the World Trade Center; a fourth airliner,
reportedly headed for the White House, crashed in a Pennsylvania field. The images
of September 11—exploding airliners piloted by shadowy terrorists, dead and dying
people, emergency personnel racing to the scenes, spectators running for their lives
when buildings collapsed—are certainly, as the old saying goes, worth a thousand
words. But just exactly what words are used to construct the meaning of this horrific
event, and by whom they are spoken, written, and repeated, not only “frame” the
event but also reveal something of interest about the working of power.
In this article, we analyze the “frame contest” (Entman, 2003, 2004) between the
dominant narrative of the September 11 attacks set out by President Bush in a speech to
the nation just hours after the event and a challenge to that narrative in the form of an
essay titled “Some People Push Back: On the Justice of Roosting Chickens,” by
University of Colorado ethnic studies professor and Indian activist Ward Churchill, dis-
covered on the Internet more than 3 years after the attacks. We are particularly interested
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in how the Denver Post, as an exemplar of the mainstream media, represented both the
counterframe and its author, why the newspaper reacted as it did, and what the conse-
quences of that reaction to the outcome of the frame contest are.
Our analysis is informed by the media hegemony thesis. Briefly stated, hegemony
refers to “the process by which ruling elites secure consent to the established politi-
cal order through the production and diffusion of meanings and values” (Carragee &
Roefs, 2004, pp. 221-222). The media are essential to that process in two ways. First,
as one of an array of “cultural workers,” in Gramsci’s (1971) sense of the term, the
media can reproduce, represent, and renew dominant meanings and values or, in the
terms of this present article, a dominant frame to a variety of different audiences but
with the single goal of securing their “consent” to that dominant frame, that is, their
acceptance of it as “common sense.” Second, because hegemony can be resisted,
altered, and challenged, the media serve as a site for frame contests (Artz & Murphy,
2000; Condit, 1994; Gitlin, 2003). Although not without its critics (Altheide, 1984;
Carragee, 1993; Mumby, 1997), the media hegemony thesis, with its emphasis 
on the working of power, provides the most robust explanation for both how and 
why the Denver Post represented and reacted to the Churchill counterframe in the
manner it did.
Framing September 11
The official frame of the September 11 attacks came within hours of the events
themselves. In a brief address to the nation that evening, President Bush portrayed
the attacks as “evil, despicable acts of terror” that resulted in the mass murder of
thousands of innocent civilians. He declared that Americans were targeted for being
“the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world.” And he went on to
warn, “No one will keep that light from shining. . . . None of us will ever forget this
day, yet we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in this world.”
Asking for prayers for all affected by the horrific attacks, President Bush asserted
that America, its friends and allies, and all those who want peace and security in the
world “will stand together to win the war against terrorism” (Bush, 2001a). In
another statement the following morning, the president declared,
The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our coun-
try were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war. This will require our country
to unite in steadfast determination and resolve. Freedom and democracy are under
attack. . . . The United States of America will use all our resources to conquer this
enemy. . . . This battle will take time and resolve. But make no mistake about it: we will
win. . . . This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil. But good will prevail.
(Bush, 2001b)
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The Bush frame of the September 11 attacks, according to Entman (2003), defines a
problematic effect (the death of thousands of civilians in an act of war), its cause (the
unprovoked and unwarranted acts of terrorists), a moral judgment (struggle of good
versus evil), and a remedy (war against terrorism). Anker (2005) fleshed out the
frame and argued that it presents a compelling melodramatic story line of villainy,
victimization, and vengeance by reducing the event and its resolution to a
Manichean battle of right versus wrong, morality versus immorality, and, in Bush’s
starkly polarized characterization, good versus evil. This melodramatic plot line fur-
thermore constructs an American national identity “that establishes its own moral
virtue through victimization and heroic restitution” (p. 25); in short, its “sacrilising
language” (Jackson, 2005, p. 35) forges a moral community, unsullied by immoral-
ity or evil and unified by shared values and the practices of freedom and democracy.
Attacked precisely because of this constructed moral exceptionalism, this powerful
victim, in the Bush frame, has no choice but retribution through engaging the evil
“other” in war (Coe, Domke, Graham, John, & Pickard, 2004; Domke, 2004;
Hutcheson, Domke, Billeaudreaux, & Garland, 2004; Karim, 2002; Silberstein,
2002; Waisbord, 2002).
Central to the melodrama of the Bush frame are the casualties of the attacks and
what their victimization represents. In characterizing them as ordinary people who
were engaged in the routines of everyday life on that fateful day, he not only stressed
their absolute moral innocence but also, in doing so, underscored the risk for all ordi-
nary Americans. In the Bush frame, the innocent victims of the September 11 attacks
represent and symbolize each and every American as well as the moral community
that is America (Lule, 2002).
The hegemony of the Bush frame was ensured by its uncritical repetition by
politicians on both sides of the aisle, military leaders, non-administrative elites, and
the mass media over the months after the September 11 attacks (Domke, 2004;
Entman, 2003, 2004; Jackson, 2005; Kellner, 2002; McChesney, 2002; Norris, Kern,
& Just, 2002). The wave of patriotism, indeed of nationalism, that followed the
attacks gives face validity to the Bush frame’s success in securing public consent.
Public opinion polls taken over those months showed an unprecedented level of
approval for President Bush, a robust optimism that the nation would be successful
in its newly declared “war on terrorism,” and an emphatic expression of support of
the “American values” of liberty, freedom, and equality (Huddy, Khatib, & Capelos,
2002). Over the ensuing year and a half, Bush would draw on this initial reservoir of
consent to expand the war on terrorism from skirmishes in the mountains of
Afghanistan in search of the diabolical mastermind of the September 11 attacks,
Osama bin Laden, to an indefinite battle against an “axis of evil” in Iraq, the home-
land of a more familiar nemesis, Saddam Hussein.
Bush’s strategy of linking Saddam Hussein, weapons of mass destruction, and the
threat of more terrorist attacks on American soil to his frame of the September 11
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attacks crafted a persuasive justification for a war in Iraq that garnered much initial
political and public support (Entman, 2004). Leading political and media figures
who otherwise might have been expected to vociferously question the decision to go
to war did so from the margins in the face of what Krebs and Lobasz (2007) refer to
as “rhetorical coercion,” that is, Bush’s strategy “to rhetorically constrain political
opponents and maneuver them into public assent to [his] preferred terms of debate
and . . . to [his] policy stance” (p. 411).
But as that war continued to drag on long after Bush’s enthusiastic declaration
that our mission had been accomplished, and as the nation wallowed in what Heller
(2005) refers to as “9/11 fatigue” resulting from “the incessant binging and manip-
ulation of evocations of national catastrophe, warnings of future threats, a drawn-out
Iraqi military occupation with no visible end-point, and the continued erosion of
civil rights in a fear-saturated, surveillance-obsessed political climate” (p. 23),
voices of opposition began to increase in number and volume.
The Churchill September 11 Counterframe
By early 2005, meaningful counterframes had emerged (Entman, 2004). One of
them came in the form of an essay titled “Some People Push Back: On the Justice of
Roosting Chickens,” by University of Colorado ethnic studies professor and Indian
activist Ward Churchill (2001). The 5,600-word essay, written the day after the
attacks and posted on the Internet 2 weeks later, was penned as an immediate and
angry rejoinder to the Bush frame.
Churchill’s self-described “stream of consciousness” invective spans centuries
and continents in its savage condemnation of U.S. political leaders and their foreign
policies. He begins with a reminder that half a million Iraqi children have died as a
result of the 1991 U.S. bombings and the subsequent embargo of food and medicine.
He goes on to cast the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks as “secular activists”
and insists their intent was to jolt all Americans out of their complacency and to
force them to realize that their shock, pain, and grief are equal to those currently
suffered by the Iraqis and historically endured by the Vietnamese, whose country
they ravaged, the Japanese citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, whose cities they
obliterated, and the Native Americans whom they dislocated and massacred. He
warns against Bush’s resolve to “rid the world of evil” by retaliating for the
September 11 attacks with war, by writing,
They are preparing once again to sally forth for the purpose of roasting brown-skinned
children by the scores of thousands. . . . To where? Afghanistan? . . . Iraq, again (or
still)? . . . Any of them or all. It doesn’t matter. The desire to pummel the helpless runs
rabid as ever. Only this time it’s different. This time the helpless aren’t, or at least are
not so helpless as they were.
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And he concludes that Americans “still don’t get” the lesson: “When you push
people around, some people push back. And they should. As they must. And as they
undoubtedly will. There is justice in such symmetry” (Churchill, 2001).
Churchill’s counterframe is far from unique in its assertion that the attacks of
September 11 are the consequences of U.S. foreign policy, particularly the bombings
of Iraq and other current and historic American actions as a global superpower. What
does separate the Churchill counterframe from all others that began emerging in
2005, however, is its transgressive nature. In Churchill’s narrative, it is not just U.S.
political leaders and their policies or, for that matter, the nation-state who are respon-
sible for the September 11 attacks but all ordinary Americans who like “good
Germans gleefully cheered” the devastating effects of those policies. And to the
Bush frame’s depiction of the victims of the September 11 attacks as innocent civilians,
Churchill replies that those in the Pentagon were “military targets, pure and simple”;
of those killed in the World Trade Center, he writes,
Well, really, Let’s get a grip here, shall we? True enough, they were civilians of a sort.
But innocent? Gimme a break. They formed a technocratic corps at the very heart of
America’s global financial empire—the “mighty engine of profit” to which the military
dimension of U.S. policy has always been enslaved—and they did so willingly and
knowingly. . . . To the extent that any of them were unaware of the costs and conse-
quences to others of what they were involved in—and in many cases excelling at—it
was because of their absolute refusal to see. More likely, it was because they were too
busy braying, incessantly and self-importantly, into their cell phones, arranging power
lunches and stock transactions, each of which translated, conveniently out of sight,
mind and smelling distance, into the starved and rotting flesh of infants. If there was a
better, more effective, or in fact any other way of visiting some penalty befitting their
participation upon the little Eichmanns inhabiting the sterile sanctuary of the twin tow-
ers, I’d really be interested in hearing about it. (Churchill, 2001)
The rhetorical trope “little Eichmanns” makes reference, of course, to Adolph
Eichmann, the high-ranking SS officer in Nazi Germany who was responsible for the
logistics of the extermination of millions of people during the Holocaust, including
more than 6 million Jews as part of the “Final Solution.” It was in regard to Eichmann
that political philosopher Hannah Arendt (1977) coined the term the banality of evil,
arguing that although his deeds were monstrous, he, himself, was a quite ordinary tech-
nocrat who performed his job with no thought as to its consequences.
The Churchill counterframe, then, does not so much challenge the Bush frame as
transgress it: It is not “who we are” that is the reason for the attack but “what we
have done.” And because what we have done is evil, to borrow the dominant frame’s
binary language, and is aided and abetted by all Americans, particularly the victims
of the September 11 attacks, then “we,” whether defined collectively in terms of a
nation-state, an imagined community or a national identity, or more distinctively as
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individuals, have no legitimate protestation of innocence or claim to moral excep-
tionalism. In 5,600 words, Churchill’s counterframe transgresses the core of the
Bush frame by exposing its most persuasive thesis that American innocence and
morality exist entirely apart from the story the frame tells about it, as nothing more
than what Barthes (1986) would term a “referential illusion.”
Yet despites its transgressive rhetoric, the essay languished in cyberspace obscurity
for 3 and a half years before it was discovered when Churchill was invited to appear
at a February 2005 symposium at Hamilton College in upstate New York. An
announcement of the talk in the student newspaper noted Churchill’s status as a con-
troversial author and outspoken Indian activist and cited a number of the inflammatory
assertions he had made about the attacks in his online essay (Mandel, 2005). Press,
public, and political reactions were swift, intense, and emotionally charged, and the
ensuing uproar played out across news and advocacy outlets, the blogosphere, college
campuses, and state capitols as it gathered steam over the ensuing months.
Media attention to Churchill’s counterframe was extensive, as a wide variety of
outlets both large and small pursued the story. The cable news networks quickly
pounced on it, and it became the lead story on Fox’s The O’Reilly Factor as well as
MSNBC’s Hardball, MSNBC Reports, and Scarborough Country within the first 24
hours. A search of the Nexis Major Papers and News Wires databases through the
first full month of the frame contest from January 27 to February 28, 2005, found
that the keywords Ward Churchill appeared in 226 separate news and op-ed items in
the major national and regional newspapers published in the United States. The story
was also the subject of 155 wire service stories and was featured in 112 programs on
cable news networks.
The content of the media’s portrayal of the Churchill story is especially revealing.
Just as the dominant frame of the September 11 attacks was condensed by the news
media into images and sound bites (Entman, 2003, 2004), Churchill’s counterframe
was reduced by media outlets across the board to his analogy of Americans as com-
plicit Nazis, specifically his labeling of those killed in World Trade Center as “little
Eichmanns.” With media focus on this single offensive figure of speech, Churchill’s
counterframe catapulted into the center of a media firestorm. In the 226 news and
op-ed pieces published during the first month of the frame contest by all outlets in
the Nexis Major Papers database, specific mentions of the phrase little Eichmanns
appear in 92 (40.7%) of the stories. References to Adolf Eichmann as a named per-
son and Nazis in general are contained in 93 (41.1%) news and op-ed pieces. And
the term victims, specifically in reference to those who died in the World Trade
Center, is mentioned in 101 (44.7%) of the Churchill-related stories in the major
national and regional dailies. In a number of news and op-ed items, the phrase little
Eichmanns appeared multiple times in the space of a single story, as did references
to Adolf Eichmann, Nazis, and the September 11 victims.
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The Denver Post and the Churchill Counterframe
To obtain a more nuanced understanding of how the media reacted to Churchill’s
challenge of the Bush frame, we conducted an in-depth qualitative content analysis
of the Denver Post’s coverage during the first month of the frame contest. We
selected the Post because it is the major daily in the mountain west and was, not sur-
prisingly, highly attentive to this story.
Like the rest of the leading U.S. national and regional print media and broadcast
news, but in contrast to much of the cable TV opinion-driven echo chamber, the Post
values “objective” reportage, and its coverage is not filtered through an overt ideo-
logical lens. Yet just like other media outlets, from the Associated Press to Fox News,
the Denver Post ignored the counterframe’s exegesis on the newly declared war on
terrorism, specifically the war in Iraq, and, in doing so, did not attempt to legitimize
it by linking it to the arguments of other counterframes that were gaining influence
in 2005. Rather, the newspaper distilled the counterframe into the rhetorical trope
little Eichmanns. In the 65 news and op-ed pieces analyzed, this phrase was cited 40
times, with an additional 69 references to Adolf Eichmann and Nazis and 79 refer-
ences to the victims of the September 11 attacks. Therefore, in all of its connotations
the phrase little Eichmanns is central to the Post’s coverage, appearing a total of 188
times, for an average of 2.9 cites per news and op-ed item.
Moral Outrage
This distillation of the counterframe to its most transgressive phrase had a signif-
icant consequence: It provided an entrée for “cultural workers,” as Gramsci (1971)
refers to them, to react with moral outrage to the “little Eichmanns” transgression
and, by doing so, reify the referential illusion of the Bush frame that American inno-
cence and morality really do exist entirely apart from the story the frame tells about
it. Table 1 illustrates the ecumenical array of cultural workers and their responses to
Churchill’s transgression that were reported by the Denver Post during the first
month of the Churchill affair.
These outpourings of moral outrage, accompanied as they were by expressions of
great reverence for the victims of the September 11 attacks, became a staple of the
Denver Post’s reportage. Quotes from numerous public and private individuals and
commentary from the journalists themselves extolled the victims’ sacrifice, empha-
sized their innocence, and excoriated as evil the perpetrators of September 11 and any-
one who would defend them. Colorado state political leaders were especially anxious
to enshrine the victims’ iconic status, as perhaps best exemplified in a unanimously
passed resolution from the Colorado House of Representatives that states, in part,
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Table 1
Moral Assessments of Churchill’s Counterframe as 
Reported by the Denver Post
January 27, 2005
“Repugnant and disparaging” Unnamed Hamilton College administrators
“Repugnant and plain looney”; State Senator Shawn Mitchell (R-CO)
“hatemonger”
“Morally outrageous” Prof. Steven Goldberg, Hamilton College
“Utter irresponsibility” Prof. Robert Paquette, Hamilton College
January 28, 2005
“Indefensible and reprehensible” U.S. Representative Mark Udall (D-CO)
“Outrageous” U.S. Representative Bob Beauprez (R-CO)
“Morally repugnant” Prof. Phil Klinkner, Hamilton College
“Offensive” Phil Stefano, University of Colorado interim 
chancellor
January 31, 2005
“Appalling” Cindy Carlisle and Patricia Hayes, Regents,
University of Colorado
“Ill thought-out and hurtful” Todd Gleeson, Arts and Sciences Dean,
University of Colorado
February 1, 2005
“Indecent, insensitive, and Governor Bill Owens (R-CO)
inappropriate”; “at odds 
with simple decency”; “far 
outside the mainstream 
of civil discourse”
“Hurtful” Kathy Trant, widow of September 11 victim
“Defamation of character Richard Pecorella, fiancé of September 11 victim
of [September 11 victims]”
“Warped sense of right and Governor George Pataki (D-NY)
wrong and of humanity”; 
“bigoted terrorist supporter”
February 2, 2005
“Evil and inflammatory blow”; House Joint Resolution 1011, Colorado House
“deplorable” of Representatives
February 3, 2005
“Disgusting” Barbara Bintliff, chair, Boulder Faculty Assembly
February 4, 2005
“Disgraceful comments” Resolution, Board of Regents, University of Colorado
“Aids our enemies”; “frankly State Senator Peter Groff (D-CO)
disgusting”
February 5, 2005
“Repugnant” Prof. Uriel Nauenberg, University of Colorado
February 6, 2005
“Antagonistic to the beliefs and Governor Bill Owens (R-CO)
conduct of civilized people”
February 10, 2005
“Grossly inappropriate” Jack Miller, Chancellor, University of 
Wisconsin–Whitewater
February 23, 2005
“Supporter of terrorists” Kimberly Craven, Hawaii College Republicans,
University of Hawaii
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Whereas, the victims at the World Trade Center were innocent in every sense of the
word and should always be remembered as innocent victims of an unprovoked attack
on America; now, therefore, be it resolved . . . that the General Assembly commemo-
rates the lives lost. (“Text of House Resolution,” 2005)
Newspaper reports were rife with statements from politicians on both sides of the aisle
who rushed to add their individual voices of assent to the resolution. A letter from
Governor Bill Owens (R-CO) to the University of Colorado College Republicans is also
illustrative; in the space of one brief paragraph, he twice mentions that the victims were
“murdered” and proclaims their innocence no fewer than three times (“Text of Owens’
Letter on Churchill,” 2005).
As a consequence of the moral outrage given voice in the Denver Post, demands
that Churchill apologize and resign from his university post quickly followed. These
calls received much of the newspaper’s attention, as did Churchill’s public and defiant
refusals to comply (Pankratz, 2005c). He eventually did some moral gerrymandering
of his own in a statement, published in full by the Post, in which he stated that his
phrase little Eichmanns applied only to “technicians” and not to the “children, janitors,
food service workers, firemen and random passers-by who were the innocent victims
of the attack” (“Text of Churchill Statement,” 2005). But the news story that accom-
panied this statement primarily focused on the appalled reactions to the continued use
of the rhetorical trope, not his ex post facto attempt to secure the moral high ground
(Pankratz, 2005a). Nor were critics assuaged by his resignation as chair of the Ethnic
Studies Department, although not from his tenured faculty position, as the Post printed
without comment the brief text of his resignation letter (Pankratz, 2005a). The
University of Colorado Board of Regents, however, did accede to the calls for public
repentance in language that reified the Bush frame’s referential illusion to a moral
community of Americans that the September 11 victims both symbolize and represent.
It issued a widely reported apology for Churchill’s “disgraceful comments,” addressed
to “all Americans, especially those targeted in the 9/11 attacks and those serving in our
armed forces” (“Text of Regents’ Resolution,” 2005).
In the second week of the controversy, the Post published excerpts from an ear-
lier online interview in which Churchill had again used the phrase little Eichmanns,
this time to characterize those who abused animals or people, and then went on to
claim that “more 9/11’s may be necessary” to put the United States “out of existence
altogether” (Kane, 2005a). Not surprisingly, this led to further expressions of moral
outrage and renewed calls by Governor Owens and an array of politicians and uni-
versity and community leaders for Churchill’s dismissal.
Reactions of moral outrage also contained expressions of anger and disgust directed
toward the University of Colorado for elevating Churchill to the ranks of the faculty.
The university was roundly castigated in several Post news and op-ed pieces for fail-
ing to follow its own procedures and standards in hiring and promoting Churchill, for
repeatedly ignoring complaints about his behavior and scholarship, and for ignoring
his counterframing Internet essay for 3 years (Kane, 2005b; Kane, 2005c).
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The voices that rose to Churchill’s defense in the pages of the Denver Post
included some students, administrators, and faculty who cited his right to academic
freedom and free speech; a number complained that Churchill was being unfairly
vilified, and some even compared the controversy to a McCarthy-era witch hunt, but
none spoke in support of the sociopolitical critique of U.S. foreign policy in his
counterframe or of his use of the rhetorical trope little Eichmanns (Kane, 2005c;
Tsai, 2005). Only two Post articles, both written by the same columnist, noted that
Churchill’s “core argument” about the connection between U.S. foreign policy and
the September 11 attacks had some merit (Rivers, 2005a, 2005b). In the Denver
Post’s coverage of the first month of this frame contest, however, that rhetorical trope
most certainly trumped any analysis of U.S. foreign policy.
Churchill’s Fraudulent Identity
The Denver Post’s focus on the transgressive rhetorical trope little Eichmanns and
its extensive coverage of the morally outraged reactions to the term diminished the
power of the Churchill counterframe to influence public consent to his alternative read
on the September 11 attacks and their U.S. foreign policy implications. The Post fur-
ther weakened the counterframe by discrediting Churchill, that is, by divesting him of
the moral capital he required to promote and defend his counterframe by exposing him
as a fraud. The reportage on this issue provided not only another entrée for various
individuals and groups to engage in the performative discourse of reifying the Bush
frame but also an opportunity to exercise a rather blunt social control over Churchill as
a counterframer.
Churchill’s interest in oppressed groups and their resistance to oppression presents
a moral “front,” that is, a public performance that may or may not be consistent with
his true identity (Goffman, 1959). His books include critiques of the justice system’s
treatment of racial minorities (1992), the FBI’s covert actions against minority
activist groups (Churchill & VanderWall, 2000), and the media’s racist portrayals of
American Indians (1992, 1993). He has written about colonizations, genocides and
ecocides in American history (1997), and Indian resistance to them (2002, a Gustavus
Myer Award–winning book). As a member of the Keetoowah Band of the Cherokee
Nation, he serves as co-director of AIM of Colorado, an activist group that broke
away from the American Indian Movement (AIM), and coordinator of the group’s
annual protest of the Columbus Day celebration and parade. Over decades of activism
that began after his service in the Vietnam War and that includes involvement with
Students for a Democratic Society, the Weather Underground, and the Black Panthers,
Churchill has been arrested several times, has been sued several times more, and has
maintained a high profile as a professor, guest speaker, and critic of the U.S. govern-
ment and its domestic and foreign policies (Curtin, Pankratz, & Kane, 2005).
The Denver Post’s task of “deconstructing” Churchill, that is, of finding his true
identity behind his front as a morally credible critic of the U.S. government and its
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domestic and foreign policies, was made that much easier by the fact that he has
never maintained a personal distance from his scholarship or activism. Any chal-
lenge to any of his identity claims, then, is a challenge to his scholarship and
activism, and vice versa.
It is his claim of being an American Indian, in fact, that brought Churchill, who
has a master’s degree but no doctorate, to the position of chair of the Ethnic Studies
Program at the University of Colorado. The university, in the interest of retaining
minority faculty, then granted him tenure as a full professor without the mandatory
7-year review (Kane, 2005c; Spencer, 2005). Yet just more than a week after the
frame contest began, a Denver Post article quoted a representative of the Keetoowah
Band of the Cherokee Nation to the effect that Churchill was not, as he claimed, an
Indian but had been granted associate membership in the impoverished band only
because he “convinced us that he could help our people,” a promise he never fulfilled
(Pankratz, 2005b).
As charges that Churchill had fabricated his ethnic identity mounted and were duly
reported in the Denver Post, additional revelations about a “clouded” Vietnam War ser-
vice record, particularly his unsubstantiated claims that he had faced combat, also sur-
faced in newspaper stories (Curtin et al., 2005; Pankratz & Merritt, 2005). And a
lengthy Post profile exposed what the authors called Churchill’s “turbulent personal
life” that has featured four marriages, allegations of marital violence, minor run-ins
with the law, multiple civil suits, and clashes with city officials (Curtin et al., 2005).
With every aspect of his ethnic and personal identity called into question,
Churchill’s “front,” that is, his academic credentials and scholarship, also was placed
under the microscope. Less than a week after the controversy first appeared in the
Denver Post, Governor Owens asserted that Churchill’s views failed to pass the test
of “useful academic work” (“Text of Owens’ Letter on Churchill,” 2005); a week
later he accused Churchill of “lack of intellectual scholarship” because “he simply
assumes things instead of proving things” (Harsanyi, 2005). In another story, Owens
claimed that “there are a number of things that call into question his competence and
his integrity” (Curtin & Pankratz, 2005) and that professional incompetence is one
of the grounds spelled out by the University of Colorado for termination of a tenured
faculty member.
In early February, the Denver Post reported on the vote of the University of
Colorado Board of Regents to review all of Churchill’s publications, speeches, and
interviews to determine whether they contained possible grounds for dismissal (Tsai,
2005), and allegations of substandard research from a variety of sources quickly
began to surface. The Post highlighted separate charges from two academics that
Churchill has engaged in historically inaccurate, misleading, and fraudulent schol-
arship throughout his career (Curtin & Pankratz, 2005). In one interview, Lamar
University sociology professor Thomas Brown accused Churchill of making up data,
specifically his unsubstantiated claim that U.S. officials intentionally distributed
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smallpox-tainted blankets to Indians. “Churchill’s tale of genocide by means of bio-
logical warfare is shocking. . . . It is also entirely fraudulent,” quotes the Post (Curtin
& Pankratz, 2005). The same story also details University of New Mexico law pro-
fessor John LaVelle’s charge that Churchill’s (1993) widely read book Indians ‘R’
Us: Culture and Genocide is “grossly misleading and misinforming.” Noting
LaVelle’s status as an enrolled member of the Santee Sioux, the article quotes him
as saying that given “America’s entrenched ignorance of the legal and political con-
cerns of Indian tribes . . . [the book] constitutes a regrettable setback in Indian
people’s struggle for social justice” (Curtin & Pankratz, 2005).
Thus, attacks on Churchill’s suspicious personal history, problematic scholarship,
and questionable academic background became thoroughly entwined with chal-
lenges to his putative ethnic identity and Vietnam War service. As a result, he was
discredited on all fronts. Just as Churchill had denied membership in any putative
moral community to the September 11 victims and the ordinary Americans they are
said to symbolize and represent, so too was he figuratively stripped of membership
in the ethnic and intellectual communities he claimed as his own.
Media Hegemony
The question remains as to why the Denver Post represented and reacted to the
Churchill counterframe in the manner it did. Our response to that question is informed
by the media hegemony thesis that proposes that in a democratic society political elites
create political and cultural consensus through persuasion more often than coercion.
Thus, traditional “cultural workers,” such as the media, are relied on to reproduce, rep-
resent, and renew dominant frames for a wide range of public audiences in order to
secure their consent. The acceptance by these public audiences of the dominant frame
as “common sense,” then, is a measure of the success of hegemony.
It is our opinion that the Denver Post’s reportage during the first month of the
Churchill affair provides three distinct examples of media hegemony. First, by follow-
ing the lead of national news outlets and ignoring the sociopolitical critique of the
counterframe, the Post excluded from public discourse the substance of Churchill’s
argument about the meaning of the September 11 attacks as a retaliation against pre-
sent and past U.S. foreign policy initiatives. Thus, by its unwillingness to interrogate
the Churchill counterframe as a “complete alternative narrative” (Entman, 2003, p. 418)
to the Bush frame, the Denver Post effectively deprived it of the resonance and mag-
nitude necessary to engage in a vigorous contest with the dominant frame. A frame
contest, it should be noted, is not just a battle over meaning but a battle for social and
political influence; thus, the newspaper ensured that the Churchill counterframe could
not weigh in to any ideological battle to “transform the popular mentality” (Gramsci,
1971, p. 348) about the meaning of the September 11 attacks.
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Second, by distilling Churchill’s counterframe to its transgressive rhetorical trope
little Eichmanns, the Denver Post provoked an array of other cultural workers—
politicians, academics, and civic leaders—to engage in the performative discourse of
expressing their moral outrage to the public. And in doing so, these cultural workers
also reaffirmed, defended, and even reified that which the rhetorical trope so offen-
sively transgressed in the first place—the Bush frame’s interpretation of the
September 11 attacks as evil assaults on pure innocence and unsullied morality. The
relentless publicity of a transgression raises not only the profile of what is trans-
gressed but also its significance and influence (Adut, 2004; Cottle, 2006). Thus, by
devoting so much of its reportage to the rhetorical trope little Eichmanns and the
moral outrage it engendered, the Denver Post not only attacked Churchill’s integrity
as a counterframer but also reminded the public of the meaning and value of the
Bush frame’s portrayal of the victims of the September 11 attacks as innocent and as
representative and symbolic of each and every American and of the moral commu-
nity that is America.
Third, by devoting a great deal of its reportage to the unmasking of Churchill as
a fraud, the Denver Post divested him of the moral and intellectual capital needed to
both defend and promote his counterframe. It should be noted that Churchill was far
from a passive victim of a press campaign to discredit him. In fact, he cleverly
eluded repeated questions about his ethnic identity and Vietnam War service and
refused to defend his scholarship against criticism. And rather than elaborating on,
or clarifying, the sociopolitical content of his counterframe when given the opportu-
nity to do so, he engaged in a series of spirited and unrepentant public defenses of
his rhetorical trope little Eichmanns, thus further raising its transgressive profile.
Both the Denver Post’s investigative reportage that exposed him as a fraud and its
coverage of his responses to the reportage, however, had the combined effect of cast-
ing, or perhaps even typecasting, him as a moral and intellectual pariah and left him
powerless to defend or promote his counterframe in any contest with the dominant
Bush frame of the September 11 attacks.
Conclusion
We recognize the media are far from powerless receptacles and reflectors of dom-
inant frames and that they can and do sometimes operate as what Stinrati (1995,
p. 168) refers to as “tools of insurrection” by producing, reproducing, and legitimat-
ing challenges to a dominant frame and thus serving as a site for frame contests. We
conclude by considering two possible reasons why the Denver Post acted more as a
tool of hegemony than as a tool of insurrection in its first month of reportage on the
Churchill counterframe.
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We begin by returning to the hegemony thesis. Far from being monolithic, hege-
mony has to be continually “renewed, recreated, defended and modified” (Williams,
1977, p. 112) in the face of resistance, contradiction, and challenge for any group to
maintain its influence and power. At some historical moments, a “crisis in hege-
mony” occurs, “a profound rupture in the political and economic life of a society, an
accumulation of contradictions” that weakens the influence of dominant ideologies
and values on daily lives and lived experiences. These are moments “when the whole
basis of political leadership and cultural authority becomes exposed and contested”
(Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clark, & Rogers, 1978, p. 217).
We suggest that just such a crisis in hegemony was occurring when the Churchill
counterframe emerged in 2005. In a historical context of “9/11 fatigue” (Heller,
2005), the failed search for weapons of mass destruction, the Abu Ghraib prison
scandal, the bloody pre-election violence in Iraq, the war protests around the world
(“Iraq Timeline,” 2005), and Bush’s plummeting approval ratings (Ruggles, 2005),
the dominant frame was being battered from all fronts.
Hegemony always has to be recreated and negotiated by political leaders, but
never more so than during a crisis of hegemony. We hypothesize that although it was
the war in Iraq that was the most contested part of the dominant frame, the crisis of
hegemony left what was the core of the frame—innocence and moral exceptionalism—
vulnerable to contestation as well. The repetition, remembrance, and even reification
of that core, such as occurred during the Denver Post’s first month of reportage on
the Churchill affair, holds it fast against threat and recreates, although perhaps only
weakly, the hegemony the dominant frame of the September 11 attacks once had.
Our use of the word core to indicate, metaphorically, a symbolic heart of the Bush
frame of the September 11 attacks brings us to a second hypothesis as to why the
Denver Post acted as a tool of hegemony rather than insurrection. As Carragee and
Roefs (2004) point out, there is no consensus definition of what a frame is, although
there is agreement that it is more than simply a story topic, attribute, or issue posi-
tion. We posit that the Bush frame’s narrative of innocence and its referential illu-
sion to moral exceptionalism constitute the core of the frame in which dominant
ideologies and values are the most densely codified and therefore the most likely to
elicit spontaneous consent. More simply put, while the war in Iraq was open to crit-
icism, contradiction, and negotiation, the innocence of the September 11 victims was
not. Thus, the Churchill counterframe, with its heavy-footed transgression of what
we are calling the inviolable core of the Bush frame, became the irresistible subject
of the tools of media hegemony by the Denver Post.
In conclusion, our analysis in this present article focused on the first month of the
Churchill affair, and even by that short time, the outcome of the frame contest was
indisputable. By refusing to interrogate his sociopolitical argument, by reducing his
counterframe to its most transgressive rhetorical trope, and by pillorying him as a per-
son and scholar, the Denver Post ensured that Churchill’s counterframe did not, and
indeed could not, achieve parity with the Bush frame of the September 11 attacks.
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